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TAKEN TO THE CLEANERS:
PANAMA’S FINANCIAL SECRECY LAWS
FACILITATE THE LAUNDERING OF
EVADED U.S. TAXES

I

t is estimated that as much as $1.5 trillion may be “laundered” every
year worldwide, or about two to five percent of the global domestic
product.1 Of this amount, $500 billion can be attributed to hiding the
proceeds of tax evasion.2 Tax evasion and money laundering, although
separate and distinct crimes, are intertwined in that all illegal proceeds,
when laundered, effectively evade taxes, and all legitimate money that
evades taxes becomes illegal and subsequently needs to be “laundered.”3
Money laundering can have substantial negative economic consequences for a country on an international scale.4 Money laundering can
disrupt a country’s financial integrity or even alter its economic policy.5
1. Linda McGlasson, Revisions to Bank Secrecy Act: Anti-Money Laundering Exam
Manual a “Positive Step,” Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.552.
See also Internal Revenue Service, Overview: Money Laundering, http://www.irs.gov/
compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=112999,00.html [hereinafter IRS Overview: Money
Laundering] (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (defining “money laundering” as “the means by
which criminals evade paying taxes on illegal income by concealing the source and the
amount of profit”)
2. Lucy Komisar, Closing Down the Tax Haven Racket, June 8, 2007, http://the
komisarscoop.com/2007/06/closing-down-the-tax-haven-racket.
3. Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to
Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911,
931 n.90 (2007). See also U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONTROL OF MONEY LAUNDERING 2 (1995) (“Hiding legitimately
acquired money to avoid taxation also qualifies as money laundering.”).
4. John McDowell & Gary Novis, The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime, ECON. PERSPS. (May 2001).
5. Id. (“Money laundering can also adversely affect currencies and interest rates, as
launderers reinvest funds where their schemes are less likely to be detected, rather than
where rates of return are higher. And money laundering can increase the threat of monetary instability due to the misallocation of resources from artificial distortions in asset and
commodity prices. . . . There are [also] significant social costs and risks associated with
money laundering. Money laundering is a process vital to making crime worthwhile. It
allows drug traffickers, smugglers, and other criminals to expand their operations. This
drives up the cost of government due to the need for increased law enforcement and
health care expenditures (for example, for treatment of drug addicts) to combat the serious consequences that result. . . . [Financial] criminal activity has been associated with a
number of bank failures around the globe . . . .”). See also Julia Layton, How Money
Laundering Works, http://money.howstuffworks.com/money-laundering3.htm (last visited
Dec. 12, 2008) (“Other major issues facing the world’s economies include errors in economic policy resulting from artificially inflated financial sectors. Massive influxes of
dirty cash into particular areas of the economy that are desirable to money launderers
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It corrupts government and banking officials, creates volatile international exchange rates, and produces unpredictable capital movements.6 Furthermore, money laundering helps fund terrorism and terrorist organizations, and undermines the national security of a country.7 But the effects
of money laundering can also be felt on a local level. Loss of tax revenue
is arguably one of the more significant socio-economic effects of money
laundering.8 A government’s inability to raise money through the collection of taxes may restrict investments in social services.9 Basic social
programs such as health, housing, and education may not be properly
funded, or may even be discontinued, because the tax revenue required to
subsidize such programs has evaded government collection through the
money laundering process.10 All citizens feel the effects of tax evasion
and money laundering, in that the loss of tax revenue forces the
government to place the burden on honest taxpayers to cover such costs
through higher tax rates.11
One of the most common and increasingly used methods to evade taxes and to launder money is to place assets in a “tax haven country.”12 In
general, a “tax haven” is simply a country that imposes few or no taxes.13
However, some tax havens provide financial mechanisms, such as
confidential bank accounts and shell companies, the only purposes of
which are to hide the identities of the true owners from tax authorities
and law enforcement of other countries.14 These countries also tend to
have strict financial secrecy laws that severely limit, if not prevent, the

create false demand, and officials act on this new demand by adjusting economic policy.”).
6. Sam Vaknin, Money Laundering in a Changed World, May 21, 2005, http://www.
globalpolitician.com/2746-money-laundering.
7. International Monetary Fund, Factsheet: The IMF and the Fight Against Money
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, Apr. 2007, http://www.imf.org/external/
np/exr/facts/aml.htm [hereinafter IMF Factsheet]. See also Juan Zarate, Assistant Sec’y
for Terrorist Fin. & Fin. Crimes, Prepared Remarks to the Florida Bankers Ass’n. (Feb. 9,
2005) [hereinafter Zarate Remarks to the Florida Bankers Ass’n] (on file with the Treasury Dep’t. Office of Public Affairs).
8. See McDowell & Novis, supra note 4. See also Layton, supra note 5.
9. Annan Boodram, The Many Faces of Money Laundering, http://www.caribvoice.
org/Business/moneylaund.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2008).
10. Komisar, supra note 2.
11. McDowell & Novis, supra note 4.
12. David Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006.
See also Komisar, supra note 2.
13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 695 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
14. Komisar, supra note 2.

2009]

TAKEN TO THE CLEANERS

467

exchange of tax-related information between governments,15 obstructing
a government’s ability to find and prosecute tax cheats. The U.N. Office
on Drugs and Crime states that such “financial havens and bank secrecy
are a ‘tool kit’ for money launderers.”16 Furthermore, in the United
States, $40 to $70 billion of tax revenue are believed to be hidden from
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) each year through the use of the tax
haven system.17
In February 2007, as part of the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act,
Panama was listed as a “probable location for U.S. tax evasion.”18 In addition, the U.S. State Department currently considers Panama a “major
money laundering country”19 for its allowance of financial transactions
involving significant amounts of proceeds from serious crimes.20 Both
tax evaders and money launderers are drawn to Panama because it has,
arguably, the strictest financial secrecy laws in the world and has even
been nicknamed the “New Switzerland.”21 This may be why Panama is
second in the world, behind Hong Kong, in the number of foreign companies incorporated in its jurisdiction, companies believed to be used for
the purpose of circumventing their local taxes.22 Moreover, the 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy23 has identified Panama as the backdrop for a wide range of money laundering schemes.24
15. David Spencer, Exchange of Tax Information, in 5 ACCOUNTANCY BUSINESS AND
89 (2006).
16. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime [UNODC], Report on Financial Havens, Bank
Secrecy and Money-Laundering, U.N. Doc. UNIS/NAR/641 (June 8, 1998) [hereinafter
UNODC, Report].
17. Mike Godfrey, Senate “Offshore” Hearing Called “One-Sided,” Aug. 3, 2006,
http://www.tax-news.com/archive/story/Senate_Offshore_Hearing_Called_OneSided_xx
xx24430.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
18. Senate Newsroom Release, Summary of Levin-Coleman-Obama Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act (Feb. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Tax Haven Abuse Act Summary]
19. DEP’T OF ST. BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, 1
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 5–6 (2007) [hereinafter INCSR
vol. 1]
20. DEP’T OF ST. BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, 2
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 53 (2007) [hereinafter INCSR
vol. 2]
21. See OffshoreLegal.org, Panama Asset Protection vs. Swiss Asset Protection,
http://www.offshorelegal.org/asset-protection/panama-offshore-asset-protection/swiss-as
set-protection-vs-panama-asset-protection.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2008) (“Switzerland
was once the offshore asset protection capital of the world.”).
22. Peter Riggs, Why Are We Negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with Tax Haven
Panama?, June 30, 2007, http://www.taxjustice-usa.org/index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=119&Itemid=47.
23. See Fin. Inst. Letter from Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Bank Secrecy Act, 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy (May 23, 2007) (noting that the 2007 National Money
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
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This is not to say that Panama necessarily condones or supports money
laundering. In fact, the country has very strict anti-money laundering
regulations.25 The problem, however, is that Panama only recognizes the
crime of money laundering when it is directly related to a specified illegal activity such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, or extortion.26 Because
the Panamanian Government does not rely on income taxes as an essential part of the tax revenue it collects, the evasion of income tax is not
considered a crime.27 Therefore, tax evasion cannot be used as a predicate offense in prosecuting a money laundering violation in Panama.28
Furthermore, Panama’s legal structure follows the “dual criminality”
principle, meaning that an offense must be a recognized crime in both
Panama and the requesting country for Panama to comply with any financial information requests.29 Consequently, petitions by the United
States for financial information in purely tax-related matters will generally not be honored.30
The dual criminality principle provides a safeguard against abuses by
foreign jurisdictions attempting to discount the privacy rights afforded by
Panama’s borders.31 A basic principle of international law is that one
country generally does not enforce the tax laws of another.32 Thus, the
Laundering Strategy was an interagency report released in May 2007 that incorporates
information accumulated from the 2005 U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment,
which identified various risks to the U.S. financial sector posed by money laundering).
24. See NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 27, 43, 51, 58 (2007). [hereinafter
NMLS 2007]
25. See Sec. Comm’n Res. No. 1-2004, Feb. 9, 2004. (Pan.); Law No. 42 (2000)
(Pan.); Law No. 41 (2000) (Pan.); Law No. 147 (1966) (Pan.).
26. Law No. 41, art. 389 (defining the crime of money laundering as the receipt, negotiation, conversion, or transfer of moneys, titles, securities, assets, and other financial
resources with knowledge that they are the product of activities related to drug trafficking, qualified embezzlement, traffic of human beings, traffic of illegal weapons, kidnapping, extortion, embezzlement, corruption of civil servants, robbery, international vehicle
contraband, and acts of terrorism).
27. Ronojit Banerjee, Money Laundering in the EU, http://www.people.ex.ac.uk/
watupman/undergrad/ron/tax20evasion.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2008). See Taxation:
Income Tax, 2008 PANAMA L. DIG. §§ 21.01, 21.09 (describing incomes not subject to
taxation under the Panama Fiscal Code of 1956).
28. Banjeree, supra note 27.
29. INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORKING TOGETHER: IMPROVING REGULATORY
COOPERATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE (2007).
30. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Ah, Panama, 47 TAX NOTES INT’L 11
(2007), available at http://www. panamaallinone.com/doc/Economic_Analysis_Panama.pdf.
31. Panamalaw.org, Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA), http://www.
panamalaw.org/tax_information_exchange_agreements.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).
32. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 352 (2005); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964). See also Banerjee, supra note 27.
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United States must work within the parameters of a county’s legal system to ensure that U.S. taxes are not evaded.
However, the obstacles to the U.S. prosecution of criminals, namely financial secrecy and dual criminality, could be circumvented very easily
with a tax treaty between the United States and Panama. More specifically, a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (“TIEA”)33 would allow for
the free exchange of financial tax information irrespective of differences
in either country’s requirement or definition of a predicate crime to money laundering.
Tax treaties are valuable mechanisms enabling U.S. federal law enforcement agencies to track down tax evaders as well as other criminals.34 The advantage of tax information is that, even if the United States
is unable to prosecute criminals for major money producing crimes, it
can still prosecute them for the accompanying offense of tax evasion. For
example, when the U.S. government could not convict Al Capone on any
of his suspected crimes, the IRS was able to convict him of tax evasion.35
Bruno Richard Hauptmann, the man famed for kidnapping the Lindbergh
baby, was initially arrested because of his failure to “launder the ransom
money successfully.”36
On an international level, tax treaties have led to the effective prosecution of those who have attempted to hide their assets from U.S. tax authorities. For example, an American taxpayer was recently convicted for
tax evasion after he tried to hide his assets in off-shore tax havens such
as Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and Panama.37 The fact that the
IRS and the Department of Justice gathered enough evidence to prosecute this case through their TIEA with Bermuda38 demonstrates the im33. Panamalaw.org, supra note 31 (“This is an agreement whereby one country can
request all financial investment information regarding [its] citizens and corporations. This
most definitely includes bank account information and stock brokerage type investments.
There is no probable cause requirement to get this information. There is no criminality or
dual criminality required. There is not even a tax violation required. The terms used in
these treaties run along the lines of the country requesting the information claiming that
[it] believe[s] the information to be relevant to [its] tax investigation.”).
34. Press Release, John Harrington, Acting Int’l Tax Counsel, Testimony Before the
Senate Finance Committee on Offshore Tax Evasion (May 3, 2007) [hereinafter Harrington] (on file with Treasury Dep’t).
35. F.B.I History, Famous Cases: Alphonse Capone, aka Al, Scarface, http://www.
fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/capone/capone.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2008). See also
IRS Overview: Money Laundering, supra note 1.
36. Paul Bauer & Rhoda Ullmann, Understanding the Wash Cycle, ECON. PERSPS. 2
(2001).
37. Harrington, supra note 34.
38. Id. (“[I]n 2004, Almon Glenn Braswell was sentenced to eighteen months in prison and ordered to pay over $10 million in back taxes, interest and penalties. Mr. Bras-
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portance of such a tax treaty. Had the taxpayer hidden all of his money in
Panama alone, the outcome would have been very different.
The key to prosecuting money laundering is simply to “follow the
money trail.”39 The ability to recover tax and financial information is the
most effective way to secure the evidence required to reach a conviction
for money laundering.40 IRS investigations of illegal income are critical
elements in assuring a money laundering conviction,41 and the agency
values that “[t]he long hours of tracking and documenting financial leads
allow an investigation to go right to the door of the money launderers
and eventually to the leader of the illegal enterprise.”42 The laundering of
money accomplishes two important purposes for the criminal. First, it
covers the trail of evidence leading back to the crime that produced the
illicit funds.43 Secondly, it conceals the money itself from forfeiture.44
For these reasons, obtaining tax information and implementing a tax treaty are of paramount importance. The United States has to be able to trace
funds back to their original crime as well as recover lost tax revenue.
This Note argues that a TIEA with Panama would allow the United
States to circumvent the strict financial secrecy laws that shield American tax evaders and money launderers from prosecution. Part I of this
Note describes the mechanics and interrelation of money laundering, tax
evasion, and Panamanian financial secrecy laws. Part II addresses the
measures the United States has implemented to combat the money laundering problem and their ineffectiveness in dealing with tax evasion. Part
III proposes how the United States could implement a TIEA with Panama to address the U.S. need for tax information, while at the same time,
respecting Panama’s commitment to protecting its financial secrecy regime.
I. MONEY LAUNDERING AND TAX EVASION IN PANAMA
First, it must be understood that money laundering and tax evasion are
separate and distinct offenses. In fact, the two processes actually have
opposite effects on money. Money laundering is an attempt to hide the
origin of illicit proceeds in order to make them appear legitimate, basiwell’s use of a Bermuda corporation and bank account as part of his tax evasion scheme
was uncovered through requests made under our TIEA with Bermuda.”).
39. Australian Instit. of Crim., Anti-Money Laundering Symposium (2002), http://www.
aic.gov.au/conferences/2002- ml/index.html.
40. Id.; IRS Overview: Money Laundering, supra note 1.
41. IRS Overview: Money Laundering, supra note 1.
42. Id.
43. UNODC, Report, supra note 16.
44. Id.
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cally turning “dirty” money into “clean” money,45 whereas tax evasion
involves hiding the profits from initially legal transactions, turning
“clean” money “dirty.”46 Yet there is a distinct similarity between the
methods used for money laundering and the commission of tax offenses.47 Both require dishonesty and concealment, and when money
from illegal activity is shielded from tax officials, there is a direct overlap between the two.48 Once money evades taxes, it needs to be laundered before it can be used again.49 In the IRS’s view, “[m]oney laundering is in effect tax evasion in progress.”50 As a result, almost all laundered money has evaded taxes and is therefore unlawful, irrespective of
its legal or illegal origin.51
The money laundering process has three separate phases: placement,
layering, and integration, also known as “wash, dry and fold.”52 The first
stage, placement, occurs when illicit funds are introduced into banking
and financial systems, the primary goal of which is to remove the illicit
funds from direct association with the precedent criminal activity.53 Oth-

45. For a statutory definition of “money laundering,” see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)
(West 2008).
46. Dean, supra note 3.
47. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Money Laundering
and Tax Crimes, http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3343,en_2649_33751_2499879_1_
1_1_1,00.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).
48. Donato Masciandaro & Julian Alworth, Tax Evasion, Tax Competition, Lax Financial Regulation and Money Laundering: Is There An Overlap? (Univ. of Bocconi
Soc. Sci. Research Network, Sept. 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=444540#PaperDownload.
49. For example, if a person receives $1000 for work and is liable to pay a forty percent marginal rate of income tax on it and fails to declare the income, then $400 is considered as being stolen from the Treasury. Therefore, he does not launder the $1000, he
launders the $400, i.e., the tax-evaded money is laundered. The complication that makes
this difficult to understand is that in order to retain the $400, he puts the whole amount of
$1000 through the laundering process. He has to show that he received $1000 legitimately in order to evade a payment of $400. Banerjee, supra note 27 (for purposes of this
Note, £ has been substituted by USD).
50. IRS Overview: Money Laundering, supra note 1.
51. Vaknin, supra note 6.
52. Karen Dearne, Cracking Down on Cash Cleaners, June 26, 2007, http://www.
australianit.news.com.au/story/0,24897,21952515-24169,00.html. For an example of the
three-stage process in the Panamanian context, see Layton, supra note 5 (recounting the
story of Harvard-educated economist Franklin Jurado, who went to prison in 1996 for
cleaning $36 million for Colombian drug lord Jose Santacruz-Londono).
53. UNODC, Money Laundering—Process, http://www.unodc.un.or.th/money_laun
dering/ [hereinafter UNODC, Laundering Process] (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). See also
NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at intro., v. (describing various known money laundering
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erwise, criminals would not be able to use the money because it would
connect them to the initial crime.54 The second stage, layering, is more
complex and attempts to further remove the connection between the
funds and the original illegal activity.55 It usually involves multiple
transactions among various financial institutions, accounts, and jurisdictions.56 The purpose is to leave a trail that is almost impossible to trace
back to its origin, and if successful, the criminal evades pursuit.57 The
final stage is integration. At this point in the process, the originally illicit
funds are reintroduced or assimilated into the economy as seemingly legitimate funds or investments.58
The banking system remains an attractive location for money launderers, because the system is susceptible to manipulation.59 Furthermore,
because of the confidential financial instruments and strict bank secrecy
regimes present in most offshore tax havens, including Panama, banks in
those jurisdictions are involved in most money laundering schemes.60
Moreover, as Panama functions under a U.S. dollar economy, U.S. tax
evaders and money launderers are drawn to the jurisdiction because capital can easily flow into the country without currency-exchange controls
or restrictions.61 Once illegal money is successfully placed, or deposited,
methods such as trade-based money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, and the Black
Market Peso exchange).
54. Layton, supra note 5.
55. UNODC, Laundering Process, supra note 53.
56. See Komisar, supra note 2 (“Often someone will use a shell company in one
jurisdiction that owns a shell in another jurisdiction that owns a bank account in a third.
That [is] called layering. No one can follow the paper trial.”); Layton, supra note 5
(“Layering may consist of several bank-to-bank transfers, wire transfers between different accounts in different names in different countries, making deposits and withdrawals
to continually vary the amount of money in the accounts, changing the money’s currency,
and purchasing high-value items . . . to change the form of the money. This is the most
complex step in any laundering scheme, and it [is] all about making the original dirty
money as hard to trace as possible.”). See also UNODC, Laundering Process, supra note
53 (stating that the layering stage “is the most international in nature”).
57. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, ANNUAL REPORT 80 (2005), available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/annual_report_2005/ keyactivities.pdf.
58. UNODC, Laundering Process, supra note 53.
59. NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at v. (stating that this was a key finding of the U.S.
Money Laundering Assessment).
60. UNODC, Report, supra note 16. See also IRS, A Look Behind IRS Anti-Money
Laundering Programs, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=124069,
00.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2008) (“Each year billions of untaxed dollars are laundered
through banks . . . in an effort to make the money appear legitimate or to evade taxes.”)
(emphasis added).
61. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 10; INCSR vol. 2,
supra note 20, at 317.

2009]

TAKEN TO THE CLEANERS

473

in an offshore haven bank account, it is easily “layered” through various
financial transactions and other tax haven jurisdictions.62 The combination of anonymity and secrecy provides a “tool kit” for money launderers63
and gives transactions in those jurisdictions a “cloak of confidentiality.”64 Once dirty money has been effectively “cleaned” offshore, banks
provide the primary gateway for the money to re-enter the United
States.65
Panama remains one of the best jurisdictions for financial anonymity.66
The U.S. State Department has listed Panama as a “country of primary
concern” for money laundering because of the confidentiality and information protection it provides.67 Anonymity can be accomplished by several means with varying degrees of secrecy and complexity, from the
simple use of a Panamanian debit or credit card account,68 to the opera62. NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at 27. See also John L. Evans, International Money
Laundering: Enforcement Challenges and Opportunities, 3 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1
(1996) (“Once the proceeds of crime are successfully deposited in the financial system
many laundering operators take the precaution of moving money, not just offshore, but
through more than one tax haven and through a maze of shell companies and respectable
nominees.”).
63. UNODC, Report, supra note 16.
64. Spencer, supra note 15, at 89.
65. NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at v. (stating this was a key finding of the U.S Money
Laundering Assessment). See also Vaknin, supra note 6 (“It is important to realize that
money laundering takes place within the banking system. Big amounts of cash are spread
among numerous accounts, (sometimes in free economic zones, financial off shore centers, and tax havens), converted to bearer financial instruments (money orders, bonds), or
placed with trusts and charities. The money is then transferred to other locations, sometimes as bogus payments for ‘goods and services’ against fake or inflated invoices issued
by holding companies owned by lawyers or accountants on behalf of unnamed beneficiaries. The transferred funds are re-assembled in their destination and often ‘shipped’ back
to the point of origin under a new identity. The laundered funds are then invested in the
legitimate economy. It is a simple procedure—yet an effective one. It results in either no
paper trail—or too much of it. The accounts are invariably liquidated and all traces
erased.”)
66. Complete Offshore Privacy and Anonymity in Panama, http://www.offshorelegal.
org/asset-protection/panama-offshore-asset-protection/complete-offshore-privacy-and-anon
ymity-in-panama.html [hereinafter Complete Offshore Privacy] (last visited Feb. 3,
2009).
67. For a complete index of “vulnerability factors” used to list countries, see INCSR
vol. 2, supra note 20, at 41.
68. See Robert L. Sommers, Tax Amnesty for Offshore Accounts: The Program and
Results, May 2003, http://www.taxprophet.com/hot_topic/May03.shtml (“Typically, taxpayers deposit funds in foreign ‘tax-haven’ banks and then access their funds with debit
or credit cards issued by the banks. The taxpayer’s identity is protected under secrecy
laws in the tax haven jurisdiction, so the IRS cannot compel the offshore banks to divulge
this information.”). See also Complete Offshore Privacy, supra note 66 (describing how a
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tion of bearer shares and shell corporations in conjunction with nominee
directors.69 Both individuals and corporations may use these financial
tools,70 and the more complex the financial arrangements are, the more
secret (hidden) the information becomes.71 The origin of any illicit money, becomes even more difficult to identify once the money is placed in a
Panamanian bank account and “layered” through subsequent bank transfers and commingled with legitimate money.72 The laundered funds are
then generally reintroduced to the U.S. market through bank wire transfers using “correspondent” and “payable through” accounts, which can
further protect against detection.73
taxpayer can purchase anonymous prepaid cards that cannot be traced because they are
purchased with cash).
69. Int’l Ctr. for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Old Laundering Methods
Hold Fast, Mar. 2007, at 3, http://pvtr.org/pdf/Financial-Response/BulkCash-Trade(ICP
VTR).pdf. See also NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at 63 (describing “Bearer Shares” as a
financial device that permits ownership to be attributed to the person in possession of the
shares, rather than the true beneficial owner of the corporation and provides for a “high
level of anonymity”) (emphasis added); IRS, Abusive Offshore Tax Avoidance
Schemes—Glossary of Offshore Terms, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,
id=106572,00.html [hereinafter IRS Glossary of Offshore Terms] (A “beneficial owner”
is defined as “the true owner of an entity, asset, or transaction as opposed to any stated
ownership provided in documents or oral representations. The beneficial owner is the one
that receives or has the right to receive proceeds or other advantages as a result of the
ownership.”); NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at 63 (“Shell Corporations generally have no
employees or physical assets and are nothing more than a mailing address.”). See also
Elizabeth MacDonald, Shell Games: With No Federal Oversight, the States are Helping
to Shelter Crooks, Money Launderers and, Possibly, Terrorists, FORBES.COM, Feb. 12,
2007, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0212/096.html (noting that generally, shell
corporations are being increasingly associated with criminal activity); IRS Glossary of
Offshore Terms, supra (Furthermore, to preserve the anonymity of true beneficial owners
of such corporations, “nominee directors” are employed to “provide a veil of secrecy as
to the beneficial owner’s involvement.”).
70. Focus Publications, S.A., Focus Panama, http://www.focuspublicationsint.com/
focuspanama/en/company-law.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2008).
71. IRS Glossary of Offshore Terms, supra note 69.
72. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 9.
73. USA PATRIOT Act, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. § 312 (2001) [hereinafter USA
PATRIOT Act] (defining a “correspondent account” as “any account established for a
foreign financial institution to receive deposits from, or to make payments or other disbursements on behalf of, the foreign financial institution [in the United States]”). See also
id.; NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at 21–22, app. A; (An example of a “payable through”
account is one where a foreign bank maintains a checking account at a U.S. bank.
“The foreign bank could then issue checks to its customers, allowing them to write
checks on the U.S. account. A foreign bank may have several hundred customers writing
checks on one ‘payable through account’ . . . .”); Buchanan, Ingersoll & Rooney P.C.,
Potential Tax Implications of the Enhanced Money Laundering Provision of H.R. 3162,
2001, http://www.buchananingersoll.com/news.php?NewsID=1251 (“The term ‘payable-
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Yet, Panama’s most important asset protection mechanism remains its
financial privacy laws; more specifically, its bank secrecy laws.74 Although the financial instruments for hiding identities, origins of money,
and bank transactions can be effective in evading the scrutiny of tax or
law enforcement officials, they do not alone grant absolute anonymity or
secrecy.75 Regardless of subsequent attempts to layer, or hide, the origin
of funds, in order to make use of Panama’s banking system, one must
initially provide his or her identification to the bank he or she wishes to
use.76 Generally, U.S. tax officials have the expertise to trace illicit money to its source, even if the “trail” is complicated and purposely confused.77 However, what Panama’s secrecy laws provide is, in effect, a
barrier to U.S. tax officials following the financial trail back into Panama.78
Under Panamanian Decree-Law No.9 of February 26, 1998, Panama
established the “Superintendency of Banks” in order to “oversee the preservation of the soundness and efficiency of the banking system” and
“[t]o punish violations.”79 The Superintendent of Banks can inquire, retrieve, and record any financial information he or she deems important in
upholding the integrity of the Panamanian banking system.80 Further-

through’ account is defined as an account through which a foreign financial institution
permits its customers to engage, either directly or through a sub-account, in usual banking business activities. A ‘correspondent’ account is defined as an account established to
receive deposits from, make payments on behalf of, or permit financial transactions to be
executed with respect to a foreign financial institution.”).
74. Mark Nestmann, Where Your Financial Secrets Remain Secret, Apr. 6, 2007,
http://www.sovereignsociety.com/ offshore2081.html. See also OffshoreLegal.org, Panama
Offshore Legal Services, http://www.offshorelegal.org/panama-bank-secrecy-laws.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009); Panamalaw.org, Panama Bank Secrecy Laws, http://www.
panamalaw.org/panama_bank_secrecy.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
75. Ronald Edwards, Panama Anonymous Bearer Share Corporations, Nov. 13, 2006,
http://www.goinglegal.com/article9864986.html (“A bank anywhere in the civilized
world will require a beneficial owner for any bank account and will also require identity
documents for that person so the bearer share corporation may not be able to conduct
banking matters completely anonymously.”).
76. See ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 146, 147
(Wouter H. Muller, Christian H. Kälin & John G. Goldsworth eds., 2007) (describing
Panama Agreement No. 9-2000 of the Superintendency of Banks of October 23, 2000
[Prevention of Unlawful Use of Banking Services]).
77. IRS Overview: Money Laundering, supra note 1.
78. See MacDonald, supra note 69. (“[W]ithout such [private corporate ownership
and bank account] information the police come to a dead end.”).
79. See Law No. 9 (1998) (Pan.), art. 5 (Functions of the Superintendency of Banks);
id. art. 84 (Information Regarding Bank’s Clients) (Superintendencia de Bancos trans.).
80. Id.
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more, all banks are obligated to maintain due diligence81 and care in
dealing with clients or potential clients,82 and must release any information requested by the superintendent to that office.83 However, the secrecy laws currently in place act as “blocking statutes” and create a legal
regime against the disclosure of that financial information to any authorities outside the country.84
The term “bank secrecy” does not address the privacy of a bank’s own
activities, but rather those of the bank’s patrons.85 A duty of discretion
regarding disclosure of patrons’ information binds all bank employees,
representatives of the bank, and government officials who are in any way
involved with banking.86 Panama’s bank secrecy laws are predominantly
regulated by Articles 84, 85, and 86 of the Banking Act of 1998.87 Article 84 of the statute prohibits the Superintendency of Banks to reveal to
a third party, such as a U.S. tax official, any information obtained from
bank records, acquired through any inquiry or investigation.88 The requirement for confidentiality extends to any staff members, external auditors, or experts who may be employed or utilized by the superintendent’s office.89 Article 85 forbids Panamanian banks from disclosing

81. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 203 (defining “due diligence” as
“such a measure of prudence, activity or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and
ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent man”).
82. Law No. 42 (2000) (Pan.) (The law provides in pertinent part, “The persons, natural or juridical, here mentioned, are under the following obligation: to adequately identify
their clients. To that effect they shall require from their customers all due references or
recommendations, as well as the corresponding certifications that attest the incorporation
and effectiveness of societies, and also the identification of officials, directors, proxies
and legal representatives of those societies, in a manner that enables them to adequately
document and determine the real owner or direct or indirect beneficiary.”).
83. Id. art. 2.
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
rpts. n.4 (1987) (“Blocking statutes are designed to take advantage of the foreign government compulsion defense, § 441, by prohibiting the disclosure, copying, inspection, or
removal of documents located in the territory of the enacting state in compliance with
orders of foreign authorities. Some statutes cover all documents, some only certain categories. . . . All blocking statutes appear to carry some penal sanction.”).
85. Rolf H. Weber, Swiss Banking Secrecy in Evolution, 18 BANKING & FIN. L. REV.
317, 318 (2003).
86. Id.
87. Shirley & Associates, Panama Bank Secrecy, http://www.shirleylaw.com/en/re
sources/bank-secrecy.htm (last visited Jan 3, 2009).
88. Law No. 9 (1998) (Pan.), art. 84 (Information Regarding Bank’s Clients, reaffirmed in Pan. G.R. S.B. No. 02-2002 (Norms That Impose Restrictions on the Use of
Available Information)).
89. Id. art. 84.
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their client’s identity or transactions, absent the client’s consent,90 while
Article 86 proscribes penalties of up to $100,000, in addition to any other
“civil or criminal sanctions that may apply” for violating the provisions
of the statute.91 Additional penalties can include imprisonment of up to
six months for certain violations.92
In addition, the attorney-client privilege supplies a final layer of security.93 By law, the use of a licensed Panamanian attorney is required to
establish a corporation, and the attorney is bound to maintain his or her
client’s confidentiality.94 The attorney-client privilege bars the release of
all information relating to the client’s personal affairs, as well as any financial dealings or transactions.95 Therefore, because it is a lawyer who
initiates a corporation, and in many circumstances, sets up its bank account and provides the required nominee directors, a tax evader using
such an arrangement is practically shielded from all tax scrutiny.96
As if these formidable obstacles to a foreign government’s intrusion
were not sufficient, recently, Panama sought to further fortify its privacy
protection by proposing amendments to Articles 187 and 188-A of its
Criminal Code.97 The amendments include imprisonment for simply publishing information regarding a third party without that party’s express
permission, or for even inquiring into a third party’s personal affairs
without official state authorization.98 Although these laws were initially
implemented to protect the privacy of public officials from the media,
90. Id. art. 85 (Confidentiality of Banks).
91. Id. art. 86 (Penalties).
92. Foundations and Trusts, 2008 PANAMA L. DIG. § 2.06 (stating that under Panama
Law No. 25 of June 12, 1995, art. 35, violations of the secrecy and confidentiality provisions of this law “shall be punished with imprisonment for six months and [a] fine of U.S.
$50,000”).
93. Sullivan, supra note 30.
94. Corporations: Incorporation, 2008 PANAMA L. DIG. § 2.03 [hereinafter LAW
DIGEST, Corporations] (Under Panama Decree 147 of May, 1966, art. 1, a Panamanian
corporation’s registered agent must be an attorney admitted to practice in Panama, and
such agents are under a duty to know their clients and maintain proper information about
their clients. However, such information is only disclosed upon petition filed by the Public Prosecutor or member of a judicial organ, relating to narcotics trafficking or “of money laundering arising therefrom.”).
95. Ronald Edwards, Why Use a Law Firm?, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.goinglegal.
com/article_97775_86.html.
96. Sullivan, supra note 30.
97. Press Release, Article 19, Panama: Proposed Criminal Code Severely Restricts
Freedom of Expression and Information (Feb. 22, 2007) (“Article 19 is an independent
human rights organization that works globally to protect and promote the right to freedom of expression.”).
98. Id.
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anyone wishing to protect his or her privacy can hide behind this legislation.99
Nevertheless, the constraints on disclosure are not unrestricted. There
remain limited situations where privileged information can and is turned
over to Panamanian authorities.100 Panama’s main bank secrecy laws
have provisions that allow for the disclosure of information to third parties if requested “within the course of criminal proceedings,”101 and this
exception extends to the attorney-client privilege as well.102 However,
information the Superintendency of Banks receives or records is not authorized to be disclosed to U.S. authorities, unless that information can
be proven to be specifically related to laundering proceeds from the drug
trade or other serious crimes.103 Tax-related misconduct is only a civil
matter in Panama, and therefore does not rise to the level of an exception
to the restriction on disclosure of information to third parties.104 For an
American tax evader whose only illegal act is to have hidden his or her
profits from U.S. tax officials, this legal system provides maximum protection with little cause for fear of prosecution.
In addition, the Panamanian tax code allows for certain foreign investors to be exempt from paying any income taxes at all.105 These exempt
foreign investors tend to be those who implement the types of financial
mechanisms mentioned earlier in order to execute the types of transactions required for tax exemption status.106 Therefore, because these taxpayers are not required to pay taxes to Panama, they cannot be guilty of
any Panamanian tax offense, irrespective of whether such violations are
treated as civil or criminal matters. There can be no crime of money
laundering if the funds allegedly laundered are legal on all levels in Panama.
The dual criminality principle107 is a significant restriction to U.S. tax
officials seeking to prosecute tax cheats for money laundering or tax eva-

99. Id.
100. Law No. 9 (1998) (Pan.), arts. 84–85.
101. Id.
102. LAW DIGEST, Corporations, supra note 94.
103. Law No. 41 (2000) (Pan.), art. 389 (Capital Laundering).
104. Panamalaw.org, supra note 31. See also Banerjee, supra note 27.
105. Fiscal Code (1956) (Pan.) (Taxation).
106. Offshorelegal.com, Tax Implications of Banking in Panama, http://www.offshorelegal.
org/offshore-banking/panama-offshore-banking/tax-implications-of-banking-in-panama.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009). See also AssetProtectionCorp.com, Panamanian Trusts, http://www.
assetprotectioncorp.com/panamatrusts.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
107. For a discussion on dual criminality, see supra Intro.
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sion.108 Because Panama adheres to the dual criminality principle, without a tax treaty in place to compel the government to release requested
financial information, tax officials must pursue the information via the
long and cumbersome process compelling disclosure through the judicial
process.109 A U.S. agency must either secure a federal court order, or a
“letter rogatory,”110 to compel a foreign jurisdiction to provide requested
information. Although foreign courts generally honor such inquiries,111
because a request of judicial assistance is based on the principle of “comity”112 between countries, Panama is not obligated to comply with such
requests.113 In fact, compliance with a letter rogatory for information in
purely financial matters is a rare event in Panama.114 Even putting the
issue of comity aside, the slow process of compelling information from a
foreign government can hinder a U.S. agency’s investigation of suspected tax evasion.115 While the process drags on, tax evaders can continue to layer and hide their money, making it very difficult for authorities to detect the funds once, or if, a request is honored.116 The U.S. State
Department has acknowledged the deficiency; because “letters rogatory
are a time consuming cumbersome process,” it recommends that they
only be used as a last resort, when “there are no other options availa-

108. For an example of how a lack of dual criminality would require a country to acquiesce to demands for information from another country, see Daily E-Mail Alert No.
1,425, Aug. 4, 2006, TECH L.J., http://www.techlaw journal.com/alert/2006/08/04.asp.
109. Dep’t of St., Bureau of Consumer Affairs, Preparation of Letters Rogatory,
http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_683.html [hereinafter DOSBCA, Letters
Rogatory] (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
110. Id. (“A letter rogatory is a formal request from a court in one country to ‘the appropriate judicial authorities’ in another country requesting compulsion of testimony or
documentary or other evidence. . . . In some countries which do not permit the taking of
depositions of willing witnesses, letters rogatory are the only method of obtaining evidence.”).
111. Edward Ord, The Internal Revenue Service Abroad, in SUMMARY OF THE CANNES
MEETING: MAY 26–27, 1988 (Milton Grundy prep., 1988).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 101
cmt. e (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895)) (“Comity, in the legal
sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.”).
113. JODY R. WESTBY, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO COMBATING CYBERCRIME 45 (2003).
114. Sullivan, supra note 30.
115. UNODC, Report, supra note 16. See also Edmund L. Andrews, I.R.S. Curtails
Many Audits in Tax Havens, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2007.
116. UNDOC, Report, supra note 16.
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ble.”117 Without a current TIEA, this burdensome process is the method
that must be used to investigate tax evasion. This being the case, IRS
officials are abandoning audits of off-shore accounts, and in some cases,
not even starting an investigation.118
It is clear that “significant restrictions on access to bank information
for tax purposes remain in . . . Panama.”119 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) states that a “[l]ack of
transparency and a failure to co-operate internationally create conditions
[in Panama] that can be exploited by dishonest taxpayers to evade their
tax obligations.”120 Unless tax officials can “tease the information they
need out of bank records,” their law enforcement efforts “come to a dead
end.”121 To demonstrate the importance of being able to follow the money trail back to Panama, both Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden
used money laundering schemes that implemented Panamanian shell
corporations and bank accounts to help fund their respective Iraqi and alQaeda military operations.122
II. U.S. MEASURES TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND THEIR
INEFFECTIVENESS IN DEALING WITH TAX EVASION
In 1970, the U.S. Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”),
acknowledging that U.S. banks were being used to hide money from
criminal activity and tax evasion.123 The Bank Secrecy Act does not
shield or hide financial information. Rather, its regulations create a financial transparency in the banking industry that allows law enforcement
and other agencies to track the laundering of evaded taxes and other
criminal activities.124 Although the BSA itself does not criminalize mon117. DOSBCA, Letters Rogatory, supra note 110.
118. Andrews, supra note 115.
119. OECD, OECD Reports Progress in Fighting Offshore Tax Evasion, But Says
More Efforts Are Needed, Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3343,en_
2649_201185_39482288_1_1_1_1,00.html.
120. Id.
121. MacDonald, supra note 69.
122. Lucy Komisar, Saddam’s Secret Money-Laundering Trail, June 2, 2004, http://the
komisarscoop.com/2004/06/02/saddams-secret-money-laundering-trail/.
123. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering: Combating Money Laundering, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/bsa/
bsa_2.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). For a statutory definition of tax evasion, see 26
I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7206 (2000).
124. James H. Freis, Jr., Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Dir., Remarks to the
PAN-Am. Congress on Asset Laundering and Fin. Terrorism Prevention and Control
(July 27, 2007) [hereinafter Freis, Jr., FinCEN Dir. Remarks]. See Cynthia A. Glassman,
SEC Comm’r, Opening Remarks Before the Symposium on Enhancing Fin. Transparency
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ey laundering, it requires financial institutions to maintain records for
certain transactions, effectively creating a “paper trail” that is used to
prosecute such cases.125 Money laundering was not criminalized in the
United States until the 1986 enactment of the Money Laundering Control
Act,126 which recognizes tax evasion as a predicate offense.127 Yet, the
BSA remains the essential anti-money laundering regulatory system for
U.S. law enforcement agencies128 and is administered by the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), the Financial Intelligence
Division of the U.S. Treasury Department.129
FinCEN has also acknowledged that financial crimes extend beyond
U.S. borders and broadened its intelligence network to include international anti-money laundering support.130 FinCEN now assists other countries in improving their efforts to combat financial crimes,131 with the
agency’s Office of International Programs being its second largest department behind the domestic component.132 International law enforcement agencies rely on information obtained though the BSA’s reporting
requirements to detect global money laundering schemes.133 FinCEN
freely shares this information with the goal of using international efforts
to ultimately protect the U.S. financial system from such financial
crimes.134
After the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon in 2001, Congress passed the “Uniting and Strengthening
(June 4, 2002) (defining “financial transparency” as “timely, meaningful and reliable
disclosures about a company’s financial performance”).
125. Bauer & Ullmann, supra note 36. See also Cook & Company, Bank Secrecy Act
of 1970 (BSA), http://www.cookco.us/financial/bank_secrets_act.htm (last visited Jan.
14, 2009) (requiring all financial institutions to submit five currency and monetary instrument reports: the Currency Transaction Report, Currency and Monetary Instrument
Reports, Foreign Bank Account Records, Suspicious Activity Reporting System, and
FinCEN Form 110).
126. Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii) (West 2008).
127. Id.
128. Freis, Jr., FinCEN Dir. Remarks, supra note 125.
129. INCSR vol. 2, supra note 20, at 15.
130. Press Release, James E. Johnson, Treas. Assistant Sec’y, Office of Pub. Affairs,
House Banking & Fin. Serv. Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight & Investigations (Apr. 1,
1998) [hereinafter Johnson Treas. Assistant Sec’y Press Release].
131. INCSR vol. 2, supra note 20, at 15.
132. Norman J. Rabkin, Dir., Admin. of Justice Issues, Statements Before the Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight & Investigations, Comm. on Banking & Fin. Services, House
of Representatives (Apr. 1, 1998).
133. IRS, Bank Secrecy Act, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=152532,
00.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
134. Freis, Jr. FinCEN Dir. Remarks, supra note 125.
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America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001,” the Patriot Act.135 Title III of the Act specifically addresses money laundering136 and presents amendments to the
Bank Secrecy Act.137 The amendments generally increase the level of
specificity required of financial institutions in the gathering and reporting
of their information.138 The most recent amendment is FinCEN’s final
rule for § 312 of the Patriot Act, which went into effect September 10,
2007, and increases the level of due diligence required by U.S. banks
when transacting with certain foreign accounts.139
However, what both the BSA’s and the Patriot Act’s requirements for
self-regulation have done is essentially transform civilian bank employees into law enforcement agents with the responsibility of monitoring and maintaining specific financial information.140 Complications can
arise when individuals in the private sector do not have the same level of
interest in meticulously maintaining the due diligence that the statutes
require or that law enforcement intended.141 The effectiveness of the statutes in producing an essential “money trail” for the prosecution of tax
evasion and other financial crimes can be undermined by those in the
industry whose primary interest is financial performance, not prosecutorial assistance.142 Although the BSA is considered an integral part of
protecting the American financial system from the movement of illicit
funds, and a majority of the private sector have complied with its requisites in good faith, clear failures to conform, and even straightforward
decisions not to comply, with the statute demonstrate the pitfalls of pri-

135. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 73.
136. Id.
137. See 31 C.F.R. § 103 (providing updated regulations relating to money and finance).
138. U.S. Commodities Futures Trad. Comm., Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing, http://www.cftc.gov/industryoversight/antimoneylaundering/index.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2009).
139. FDIC, Fin. Inst. Letter, USA Patriot Act, Final Regulation Implementing Section
312—Special Due Diligence Programs for Certain Foreign Accounts (Dec. 21, 2007). See
31 U.S.C.A. 5318(i)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (West 2008) (describing three specific types of foreign
bank accounts to which the rules apply, more specifically, those banks operating under an
offshore banking license, a license issued by a country designated as being noncooperative with international anti-money laundering principles, or a license issued by a
country designated by the Secretary of the Treasury as warranting special measures due
to money laundering concerns).
140. Vaknin, supra note 6.
141. Mark Pieth, Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives to Combat Money Laundering and Bribery, in LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 95 (Christian Brütsch &
Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007).
142. Id.
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vate self-regulation.143 Two current examples are Bank of America being
fined $3 million in January 2007 for “fail[ure] to comply with antimoney laundering rules relating to ‘high risk’ accounts,”144 and American Express agreeing to pay $65 million for similar BSA violations.145
These lapses fundamentally defeat the purpose of any anti-money
laundering legislation and demonstrate a weakness in the system. However, “the continued safeguarding of the [U.S.] banking system” from the
threat of money laundering remains the U.S. government’s primary
goal.146 The 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy identifies areas
vulnerable to money laundering for the purpose of adjusting and strengthening current federal laws in the area.147 Yet, even with full and proper
compliance with current or improved statutory regulations on the part of
all participants in the banking industry, the requirements for the collection of information do not extend into Panama. FinCEN’s increased international effort to combat money laundering and the heightened reporting conditions put in place after September 11th do not overcome the
BSA’s limitations in appropriating information from Panamanian financial institutions or officials. As discussed above, although Panamanian
officials collect financial information as per their anti-money laundering
regulations, this information cannot be exchanged with U.S. officials
unless the United States can demonstrate that such information is directly
related to a criminal investigation.148 Notwithstanding the U.S. government’s increased ability under the Patriot Act to requisition documents
from foreign banks,149 Panama’s dual criminality requirement effectively

143. Zarate Remarks to the Florida Bankers Ass’n, supra note 7. For further commentary on the subject of self-regulation, see Christian Brütsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl, Introduction, in LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 141, at 1, 1–
8.
144. Jonathan Stempel, Bank of America Unit Fined over Money Laundering,
MONEYNEWS.COM, Jan. 29, 2007, http://archive.moneynews.com/money/archives/articles/
2007/1/29/114547.cfm.
145. John Poirier, American Express Fined $65 Million over Money Laundering,
REUTERS, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www. reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSN064458002
0070807.
146. McGlasson, supra note 1.
147. FDIC, Fin. Inst. Letter, Bank Secrecy Act: 2007 National Money Laundering
Strategy (May 23, 2007).
148. See discussion supra Part I.
149. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(k)(3)(A)(i) (West 2008) (“In general, the Secretary of the
Treasury or the Attorney General may issue a summons or subpoena to any foreign bank
that maintains a correspondent account in the United States and request records related to
such correspondent account, including records maintained outside of the United States
relating to the deposit of funds into the foreign bank.”).
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negates any legislatively expanded authority and allows evaded taxes to
be shielded from U.S. agency inquiries.
Internationally, the United States combats money laundering through
the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), a thirty-three member organization established in 1989 by the G-7 Summit in Paris, whose primary
focus is on promoting anti-money laundering policies.150 The United
States, through FinCEN, was an essential part in the FATF’s development and aided the agency in its initial policy considerations.151 Although Panama is not one of the FATF’s thirty-three members, it is a
member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (“CFATF”).152
The CFATF was established in 1992 and is one of many “FATF-style
regional bodies, which, in conjunction with the FATF, constitute an affiliated global network to combat money laundering and the financing of
terrorism.”153 These task forces were implemented as a way to get around
the burdensome process of using letters rogatory to compel foreign jurisdictions to provide information.154
To facilitate the exchange of information, two of the FATF’s most significant recommendations were that countries criminalize money laundering beyond drug-related offenses and that banks report suspicious
transactions to domestic authorities.155 Although Panama has complied
with both proposals, it has not extended its list of predicate offenses to
include tax-evasion156 or made any specific references to tax matters in
its Suspicious Activity Reporting Agreement.157 Therefore, Panama’s
dual criminality constraint hinders the FATF’s power to obtain informa150. IMF Factsheet, supra note 7.
151. Johnson Treas. Assistant Sec’y Press Release, supra note 130.
152. INCSR vol. 2, supra note 20, at 33.
153. Id.
154. Pieth, supra note 142, at 81 (“[T]he traditional instruments of international law
are frequently considered too cumbersome and slow. Increasingly, international law is
created by unconventional means: ‘task forces’ prove to be far more expedient . . . .”).
155. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 113. For a complete
list and description of the FATF’s Forty Recommendations, see also the Financial Action
Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org (then follow “40 Recommendations” hyperlink)
(providing “a complete set of counter-measures against money laundering”).
156. See Law No. 41 (2000) (Pan.), art. 389 (amending the Penal code to expand the
predicate offenses for money laundering beyond narcotics trafficking to include “qualified embezzlement, illegal weapons traffic, human traffic, kidnapping, extortion, embezzlement, corruption of civil servants, terrorism, robbery or international vehicle contraband established in the Panamanian Law”) (Superintendencia de Bancos trans.).
157. INT’L MONETARY FUND, PANAMA: DETAILED ASSESSMENTS OF OBSERVANCE OF
STANDARDS AND CODES FOR BANKING SUPERVISION, INSURANCE SUPERVISION, AND
SECURITIES REGULATION 172 (2007). See id. at 176 (describing a proposed amendment to
include tax-related matters in the Suspicious Activity Reporting Agreement).
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tion through the CFATF relating purely to tax evasion. In addition, Panama’s secrecy laws prohibit the Unidad de Analisis Financiero, the
country’s financial intelligence unit, from disclosing such tax-related
information to its foreign counterparts.158 This lack of transparency is
why Panama is perpetually labeled by the U.S. Department of State a
“jurisdiction of primary concern” as a “major money laundering country.”159
Furthermore, the exclusion of tax-related violations as a predicate offense for money laundering in Panama’s legal system even impedes U.S.
agencies’ ability to acquire finical documents directly through the U.S.
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”)160 with Panama.161 This is
because “the MLAT is used primarily to fight narcotics trafficking, related money laundering, and other serious crimes. ‘Pure tax’ matters are
not covered.”162 Therefore, the ability to request information through the
MLAT, relating to a money laundering probe, may not necessarily be
used in a tax investigation scenario.163 Panama’s classification of tax
evasion as only a civil violation seriously impedes the United States’
ability to find and prosecute American tax evaders.
The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act,164 introduced to the Senate in February 2007, has attempted to narrow the scope of legislation to target tax
evasion specifically through alleged tax haven countries. If adopted, the
bill would put in place presumptions of tax evasion for certain transactions completed through specified off-shore jurisdictions, such as Panama.165 The summary of the bill explains that the need for such presump158. FinCen Advisory, Advisory Issue 23, Transactions Involving Panama, (July
2000), http://www.fincen.gov/news_ room/rp/advisory/html/advis23.html.
159. DEP’T OF ST. BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,
MAJOR MONEY LAUNDERING COUNTRIES 2005 (2006), http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/
2006/vol2/html/62131.htm.
160. INCSR vol. 2, supra note 20, at 31 (MLATs, “which are negotiated by the Department of State in cooperation with the Department of Justice[,] . . . allow generally for
the exchange of evidence and information in criminal and ancillary matters. In money
laundering [and asset forfeiture] cases, they can be extremely useful as a means of exchanging banking and other financial records with treaty partners.”).
161. INT’L MONETARY FUND, UNITED STATES: REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF
STANDARDS AND CODES 14 (2006).
162. Sullivan, supra note 30.
163. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., ACCESS FOR TAX AUTHORITIES TO
INFORMATION GATHERED BY ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AUTHORITIES: COUNTRY
PRACTICES (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/5/2389989.pdf.
164. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act] (Title I: Deterring the Use of Tax Havens for Tax Evasion).
165. Id. § 101 (establishing presumptions for entities and transactions in offshore
secrecy jurisdictions).
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tions stems from the tax and secrecy laws of these jurisdictions, which
effectively prevent U.S. authorities from accessing the necessary information.166 Section 205 clarifies that U.S. investigators may access Suspicious Activity Reports gathered in tax haven territories for civil tax
matters, and not strictly for criminal proceedings.167 Yet, the most significant provision of the proposed Act attempts to circumvent the dualcriminality provision by expanding the Treasury Secretary’s authority
under § 311 of the Bank Secrecy Act, allowing him to impose financial
penalties on jurisdictions and financial institutions determined to be “impeding U.S. tax enforcement.”168 The Treasury Secretary would also
have the power to limit such institutions’ abilities to operate and conduct
business within the United States.169 The bill essentially requires that a
jurisdiction have a tax treaty, or similar agreement, in place to provide
for timely and mandatory exchanges of tax information.170 However, the
bill is not yet law, and while there is some congressional support for its
underlying challenges to the fundamental structure of tax haven jurisdictions,171 there are those who believe the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act has
little chance of becoming legislation.172 In fact, even those who support
the bill recognize that congressional backing is weak.173 Therefore, until
Congress decides the fate of the bill, the United States remains in its
current position of relative ineffectiveness in appropriating information
from Panama relating to the evasion of U.S. taxes and possible underlying illegal activity.
III. A PROPOSAL TO IMPLEMENT A TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE
AGREEMENT
Every country has the right to implement and enforce both tax and
legal systems that best suit its needs and promote competition for
166. Tax Haven Abuse Act Summary, supra note 18.
167. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, supra note 164, § 205 (calling for improved “Enforcement of Foreign Financial Account reporting”).
168. Id. § 102 (authorizing “Special Measures against Foreign Jurisdictions, Financial
Institutions, and Others That Impede United States Tax Enforcement”).
169. Id.
170. Id. § 7492(b)(F)(D)(i) (“[A] treaty or other information exchange agreement with
the United States that provides for the prompt, obligatory, and automatic exchange of
such information as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions of the treaty or
agreement or the administration or enforcement of this title.”).
171. Komisar, supra note 2.
172. Robert E. Bauman, The Anti-Tax Haven Jihad, SOVEREIGN SOC’Y LTD., Feb. 22,
2007, http://baumanblog.Sovereignsociety.com/2007/02/the_antitax_hav.html (describing
the possible challenges to the constitutionality of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act).
173. Komisar, supra note 2.
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investment.174 Countries often create tax regimes that will assure a
certain amount of revenue for the government, while rarely accounting
for the laws of other jurisdictions or the potentially harmful impact they
may have on surrounding regions.175 As the current situation illustrates,
conflicts can emerge when a country must access information that may
be protected by a foreign legal system, in order to enforce its own
laws.176 A government’s inability to investigate potential tax violations
that transcend its borders facilitates the evasion of domestic taxes by encouraging taxpayers to transfer assets to foreign jurisdictions.177 There is
a traditional rule that one nation will not assist another nation in enforcing its tax collection procedures.178 This causes a tension between the
sovereign power of one nation to “enforce its laws and protect its borders,” and the sovereign power of another jurisdiction to enforce its
secrecy laws and keep private any information within its territorial boundaries.179 Yet, these types of conflicts have generally been resolved
through the execution of collaborative tax treaties.180
This Note argues that the best approach for the United States to reconcile its need for tax information with Panama’s right to its tax and bank
secrecy systems is to negotiate a TIEA with Panama. The government of
Panama has demonstrated in recent years that it is not unconditionally
opposed to the exchange of tax information.181 Although Panama has not

174. Rafael E. Berrocal R., If It Agrees to OECD’s Changes, Panama Could Lose Its
Financial Privacy, Feb. 13, 2001, http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/Articles/epa02-13-01/
epa02-13-01.shtml.
175. Dean, supra note 3, at 924.
176. Sullivan, supra note 30.
177. Dean, supra note 3, at 925.
178. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 351 (2005). See also Spencer, supra
note 16, at 88.
179. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 117. See also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 654–55 (defining “Sovereignty” as “the
supreme political authority of an independent state,” and “Sovereign Power” as “the
power to make and enforce laws”).
180. Dean, supra note 3, at 924.
181. See Letter by Norberto Delgado Duran, Minister of Econ. & Fin. for the Rep. of
Pan., to the Sec’y Gen. of the OECD (Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Letter by Minister of
Econ. & Fin. for the Rep. of Pan.]. See OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36
734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (describing the organization as an intergovernmental body that “monitors trends, analyses and forecasts economic developments and researches social changes or evolving patterns in trade, environment, agriculture, technology, taxation and more. [The OECD] provides a setting
where governments compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems,
identify good practice and coordinate domestic and international policies.”).
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signed any such treaty with another country,182 and has refused to approach the issue with the United States,183 a treaty better tailored to accommodate Panamanian concerns may be able to overcome this hurdle.
In April 2002, Panama sent a commitment letter to the OECD, agreeing to respect the Organization’s principles of “effective exchange of tax
information.”184 The government expressly agreed to exchange bank and
financial information with other countries investigating tax matters that
may only rise to the level of civil offenses in Panama, and would normally be barred from disclosure.185 However, in December of that year,
Panama’s government expressed concern to the OECD about the organization’s lack of “non-discriminatory treatment.”186 The government believed that the OECD was not committed to creating a “level playing
field” and favored certain European OECD members by exempting them
from the same exchange obligations as were imposed on Panama.187
Concerned by the OECD’s double standard and inaction to ameliorate
the disparity, Panama withdrew from its earlier commitment.188 The
OECD’s policy was viewed as a threat to Panama’s sovereignty189 by
trying to impose restrictions, unfairly and inequitably, on its ability to
compete in the financial services market.190
Nevertheless, by negotiating a TIEA solely with Panama, where information exchange commitments would be equal between both countries, the United States could resolve the “level playing field” issue. A
narrow jurisdictional scope with equally binding terms would indicate a
dedication to fairness and a respect for Panama’s sovereignty. Panama
has a legitimate concern that it may lose its competitive edge in the region if it relaxes it secrecy laws.191 Due to the fact that other notorious

182. Panamalaw.org, supra note 31.
183. Robert E. Bauman, Where Are They Now? The World’s Top Asset Havens . . .
Still On Top, 6 ESCAPE FROM AM. E-ZINE (July 2004) http://www.escapeartist.com/efam/
60/Best_Banking_offshore.html.
184. Letter by Minister of Econ. & Fin. for the Rep. of Pan., supra note 181.
185. Id.
186. Press Release, Gov’t of the Rep. of Pan., Panama Reiterates to the OECD the
Need for Equitable and Non-Discriminatory Treatment (Dec. 10, 2002).
187. Id.
188. Daniel J. Mitchell, Strategic Memorandum from the Ctr. for Freedom & Prosperity (Jan. 6, 2003), http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/memos/m01-06-03/m01-06-03.shtml.
189. See Dean, supra note 3, at 935 (Panama, as a recognized tax haven jurisdiction,
would perceive the OECD initiative as a threat to its sovereignty).
190. Daniel J. Mitchell, The OECD’s Dishonest Campaign Against Tax Competition:
A Regress Report, Prosperitas: A Policy Analysis from the Ctr. for Freedom & Prosperity
Found., vol. IV, iss. I, 1–2 (June 2004).
191. Dean, supra note 3, at 958.
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“tax havens” such as the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands have signed
TIEAs,192 the value to Panama in maintaining its secrecy laws and not
entering into a similar agreement increases.193 Yet, through diligent negotiations, both countries could circumvent this concern by narrowly
tailoring the conditions that would trigger the requirement to exchange
information, and restricting the categories of data that would have to be
transferred.
Conceivably, both countries would be able to define specific circumstances that would elicit the exchange of information, but that do not infringe on Panama’s general assurance of secrecy. For example, by limiting a situation to defined asset amounts transferred through specific types
of financial instruments or transactions that originate from U.S. banks,
U.S. investigators could gain access to information customized to tax
evasion, while Panama could retain its overall international commitment
to secrecy. Although such a limited scope may exclude many instances
of tax evasion and money laundering from scrutiny, it would at least be a
step in the right direction. Collaboration on a small scale would allow
authorities in both nations to familiarize themselves with an increased
volume of information exchanges, without getting overwhelmed by a
flood of requests that may accompany a broader treaty. As the process
becomes more customary, it may be easier to slowly expand the treaty’s
reach.
In addition, a narrow scope would mean that only very specific transactions, those purposely instigated to evade U.S. taxes, would be deterred
from going through Panama. Therefore, the country could retain its lucrative bank secrecy regime with little financial loss from legitimate
business. Additionally, the Unites States could offset any minimal loss to
Panama by implementing an asset sharing program. The countries could
share not only the revenue from recovered taxes, but also any punitive
damages U.S. authorities impose for tax violations.194 Regardless of the
specific provisions of a U.S.-Panamanian TIEA, a treaty would require a
careful balancing of both countries’ right to administer their respective
laws. This will only be possible through diligent diplomacy and the willingness of each government to accommodate and respect the other’s
necessities.

192. Sullivan, supra note 30.
193. Dean, supra note 3, at 958.
194. See 26 I.R.C. § 7431(c) (2000) (authorizing the imposition of punitive damages
for convictions of tax evasion).
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CONCLUSION
The loss of tax revenue to the U.S. Treasury is a significant side effect
of money laundering with a substantial impact on the U.S. economy.
Evaded taxes are typically funneled through tax haven countries because
of the anonymity and strict secrecy laws those jurisdictions provide. The
lack of economic transparency in these offshore havens permits the origin of illicit funds to remain hidden from U.S. investigators, and aides
the money’s re-entry into the U.S. banking system as seemingly legal
money. Although tax evasion and money laundering are inherently similar, they are separate and distinct violations. While both can be criminal
matters in the United States, the evasion of taxes is not a criminal issue
in Panama unless the tax evasion directly implicates a more serious
crime usually relating to drugs. Only in those situations do Panama’s
secrecy laws authorize disclosure of tax and financial information.
Therefore, requests for information in purely U.S. tax evasion investigations will generally not be honored. This creates a safe haven for tax
cheats to hide their money and subsequently launder it back to the United
States.
The U.S. government has made a cogent effort to strengthen its domestic laws regarding money laundering and financial crimes. However,
reinforced domestic legislation can neither overcome the principle of
dual criminality, nor compel Panama to breach its own secrecy regime.
Furthermore, international financial task forces, put in place to combat
money laundering, have also not been able to reach purely economic
matters such as tax evasion. Consequently, evaded taxes remain protected in Panama.
Nevertheless, the signing of a TIEA could circumvent the barriers established by secrecy laws. Although Panama does not currently have
such an agreement in place, it may be possible through diplomatic channels to tailor an agreement that would accommodate both the United
States’ need for access to financial information and Panama’s insistence
that its secrecy laws not be compromised. However, until such a TIEA is
effectuated, Panama’s bank secrecy laws will continue to facilitate the
laundering of evaded U.S. taxes.
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